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The Penteract Methodology

To think law is not merely to apply it.

It is to construct, to perceive, to interpret.

It is to shape structure, to trace logic, to unveil meaning.

And it is to root that meaning in language, context, and time.

Just as a mathematical theorem cannot be grasped without discerning the inner logic of its deductions,

and just as a sentence yields its full force only when its structure — and its silences — are made visible,

a legal case cannot be reduced to a compilation of applicable rules.

It demands legibility, rigour, contextual understanding, and breadth of vision.


DO NOT MERELY “APPLY THE CORRECT LAW”

A Multidisciplinary, Stratified Methodology


I. Introduction — Why the Strict Application of the Law Will Not Do

Applying the law is often presented as a simple task:

know the rule, follow it.

But thinking the law is something else entirely.

It requires the ability to:

– organise legal matter with the precision of higher geometry,

– construct valid chains of reasoning with the discipline of logic,

– choose one’s angle of approach as in optics,

– and discern, through language, what is said — and what is withheld — with the acuity of linguistic analysis.

This is no intellectual indulgence.

It is the condition of clarity.

For just as a mathematical proof must hold internally,

and a phrase draws power from both its syntax and its silence,

a legal argument must be more than a heap of norms:

it must be structured, coherent, interpretative, and perspectival.

To think law is to erect a scaffolding of meaning —

and to recognise, precisely, the moment when that scaffolding begins to crack.


II. The Penteract Model – Thinking Law in Five Dimensions

Law does not unfold along a single axis.

It weaves itself into layered structures — semantic, cultural, normative, territorial, and strategic.

The Penteract is the framework Peeters Law has shaped to make these layers legible.

It names five dimensions that, taken together, do not simplify the legal real — they render its full topology visible:

– language and legal culture,

– norm,

– jurisdiction,

– substantive domain,

– strategy.

This is not a taxonomy. It is an architecture.

Each layer speaks to the others, resonates across borders, and carries its own tension.

Together, they sketch a cartography — not of rules, but of legal sense.

But even the most precise framework cannot escape its own geometry.

There comes a point — rare, but real —

where all five layers align,

yet justice remains out of reach.

A case perfectly structured, procedurally sound, logically impeccable —

and still, something is wrong.

No further interpretation will mend it.

No additional argument will resolve it.

It is the point at which the structure turns upon itself.

Where law, though present, fails.

Where coherence becomes illusion.

This is not a flaw in the model.

It is its edge.

A Heyvaertian singularity.

Named for the Belgian legal thinker Alfons Heyvaert,

who believed that true legal analysis does not conclude with application,

but begins where the system fractures.

Where reasoning must be suspended,

and the architecture — interrogated.

Sometimes through a constitutional challenge.

Sometimes by a preliminary reference.

Sometimes by silence.

This singularity is not a dimension.

It is a rupture —

a space of structural dissonance,

where law can no longer conceal what it fails to reach.

It is the moment where the legal mind

must cease to operate within the model

and begin to question the model itself.


III. Not an Algorithm, but an Analytical Compass

The Penteract model is not a formula, nor a mechanism, nor a legal machine that delivers answers.

It promises no outcomes.

It is not a grid to be filled in —

but a commitment.

A commitment to clarity of thought.

A methodological pact in service of fairness.

A mental instrument for navigating the labyrinth of legal reality.

To think the law is to reject the illusion of linearity.

It is to accept the initial opacity, the untamed complexity.

To layer meaning,

to trace the invisible lines that connect fact to norm, norm to culture, culture to strategy.

To think the law through the Penteract

is to accept that what is visible does not exhaust what is real.

It is to give shape to the amorphous —

not by reducing it, but by revealing its form without fixing it.

It is to approach truth not as a conclusion,

but as a movement, an aperture, a tension borne by doubt.


IV. Seeing Beyond 3D — The Wide-Angle Perspective

Human perception is confined to three dimensions.

But legal configurations unfold in a mental space that is broader, deeper — five-dimensional at the very least.

This is why we work with a wide-angle conceptual lens.

As in photography,

the wide-angle lens expands the field of vision,

unearths hidden relations,

and accepts a certain distortion —

not to falsify, but to reveal the whole.

So too the Penteract model:

it does not merely expose the rule, but the forces that inhabit it;

not only the clause, but the legal culture from which it emerges.

It does not settle for outcomes:

it questions the interpretive frame that makes them possible.

Without wide angle, there is no depth.

Without perspective, no precision.

Without decentring the gaze, no access to meaning.

A standard lens (50mm) offers clarity — but restricts.

A wide angle (24mm, or even less) opens the horizon — sometimes to its very edge (a 180° fisheye).

It bends space, distorts proximity — not to deceive, but to make visible what would otherwise remain beyond the frame.

The lens concentrates the light of an immense scene onto a finite surface.

It warps what is near, but reveals what lies hidden.

So too in law:

the one who focuses exclusively on a single dimension —

on norms alone, or jurisdiction alone, or territory alone —

risks losing the larger view.

And with it, the very sense of what they claim to defend.

Our wide-angle gaze stretches, unfolds, exposes.

It alters form, but honours truth.

It may bend geometry, but never ethics.

It shifts centres without denying them.

It restores to complexity its rightful dignity.


V. Why a Structured Model Is Essential

Law is not a mosaic of scattered rules,

nor a casual stacking of floating norms.

It is a fabric — a layering, a weave of meanings, competences, and normative hierarchies.

It operates across multiple strata: national, European, international —

layers that intersect, brush against one another, sometimes clash,

often without cancelling each other, never without transformation.

In such a landscape, linear reasoning collapses.

The classical syllogism falters.

Monolithic thought wavers.

At that point, a model becomes essential.

Not a machine —

but a structure.

A mental architecture capable of accommodating plurality without erasing it.

The Penteract model is such a structure:

a stratified framework, articulated in five interdependent dimensions —

and aware of a sixth figure that does not extend the model,

but marks its rupture:

the point where the system falters,

where law reaches its limit,

where silence becomes more truthful than continuation.

This is not a flaw.

It is the apex of integrity —

the moment at which the legal thinker does not conclude, but reflects.

Where form breaks open

and ethics begin.


VI. Inspiration — Walter van Gerven

This model echoes the deep intuitions of Professor Walter van Gerven,

who saw European law as a layered polity —

a dialogical legal order

in which national and supranational sources intertwine without dissolving into one another.

Against the pull of reductionism, he reminded us:

> “Legal certainty must never be mistaken for rigidity.

The more complex the context, the greater our need for open norms,

structured interpretation, and proportionality.”

The Penteract takes up this demand and renders it operational:

Five dimensions — and a structural rupture.

A continuous attentiveness to semantics, to context, to balance.

Its architecture draws from Van Gerven’s vision.

But its form and method — borrowed from geometry, physics, and linguistics —

are Peeters Law’s own.

It is both a tribute and a departure.

It honours a layered legal reality — and thinks through it.


VII. The Five Dimensions — and the Heyvaertian Fracture

The Penteract model unfolds across five foundational dimensions that structure any legal inquiry:

– Language & Legal Culture

– Context & Factual Framework

– Applicable Legal Order

– Substantive Domain of Law

– Strategic Positioning

These five layers interlace to form a comprehensive analytical map.

They guide legal interpretation, shape argumentation, and define the very coordinates of meaning.

But there are cases — rare, unsettling, decisive —

where even this layered reading fails to grasp the core of injustice.

When all five dimensions align,

and yet the outcome still jars.

This is where the model encounters its own boundary.

Where structure becomes silence.

Where the law, though intact, proves insufficient.

This fracture is not a sixth layer.

It is a Heyvaertian singularity:

a moment of structural rupture,

where the legal framework no longer reveals, but conceals.

A point where the legal mind must pause,

and ask: what is being excluded here?

Not to extend the reasoning —

but to interrogate the very architecture from which that reasoning emerges.


VIII. Multidisciplinarity as a Structuring Principle

To think law demands a constant porosity to other disciplines.

Not out of eclecticism —

but because law, to be spoken rightly,

must pass through the languages that precede it,

the structures that sustain it,

the worlds it seeks to regulate.

It must open itself to:

– linguistics, for its analysis of meaning, usage, and polysemy;

– political science and economics, for the contexts in which law operates and intervenes;

– comparative law, to question what seems self-evident and to draw strength from otherness;

– normative theory, to remain inhabited by the question of the just.

The legal arguments we construct, then, are never purely formal.

They are:

– intellectually sound,

– contextually aware,

– methodologically responsible.

At Peeters Law, we believe that only within this triad

can law retain its social meaning, its critical force, and its symbolic weight.

This is not about layering disciplines on top of law, as one adds colours to a palette.

It is about recognising their constitutive entanglement.

Law exists only in dialogue —

with language, with power, with normativity, with the world.


IX. Why We Refer to Mathematics, Physics, and Linguistics

Because to think law is to learn how to construct.

And no discipline constructs with greater rigour than mathematics.

Because to think law is to reason with precision.

And no field teaches validity more stringently than formal logic.

Because to think law is also to perceive.

And physics — especially optics — shows us that perception is never neutral:

it is always situated, always shaped by angle, by light, by distance.

And finally, to think law is to make meaning.

And only linguistics — in its triple semantic, pragmatic, and grammatical dimension —

reveals how meaning arises, weaves itself, shifts across contexts.

This is not an abstract preference.

It is a necessity.

These disciplines illuminate what remains invisible in legal reasoning:

its fragility,

its dependence on the gaze that frames it,

its contingency.

Can a single word — “reasonably” — bind in a contract?

What is the difference between a threat, a promise, and a mere observation —

if not intent, tone, and the context of enunciation?

The interpretation of a legal text — by a court or an entire legal order —

always depends, at its core, on the language in which it is written,

and the legal culture in which it is read, heard, and applied.


X. A Concrete Example — Freelancers and Platform Contracts

Let us imagine the following:

a European collective of independent workers wishes to challenge the unilateral clauses imposed by a digital platform.

They invoice through intermediaries.

They are bound by English law.

The general terms and conditions are drafted in English.

The platform reserves the right to introduce any “reasonable” modification.

How should the law be approached in such a context?

Through the Penteract method.

Through geometry: by structuring the case in layers — applicable law, jurisdiction, market dynamics, normative foundations.

Through logic: by constructing a chain of coherent reasoning from the facts.

Through optics: by adopting the viewpoint of the user, the judge, the regulator — each with their own blind spots.

Through linguistics: by questioning what “reasonably” means in this multilingual and multilegal context.

In British English?

In Belgian law?

In EU legal doctrine?

In the technical idiom of platform contracts?

Thanks to this wide-angle approach, invisible forces become legible.

And the correct legal framework — sometimes hidden behind an innocuous clause — can be activated.

What a narrow reading would ignore, the method reveals.

What literal interpretation overlooks, layered analysis brings to light.

Legal truth does not lie in immediate clarity.

It is discovered in the tension between layers,

in the resistance of words,

in the shifting movement of meaning.


XI. The Necessity of Methodological Rigour

The Penteract model is no stylistic ornament.

It is neither a conceptual gadget nor a rhetorical flourish.

It is a demand.

A rigour.

A necessity.

It renders law visible, legible, coherent — precisely where landmarks begin to blur.

It brings structure to light without ever crushing it.

And, above all, it knows when to stop.

For the truth of law lies not only in its application.

It also resides in the question mark,

the suspended breath,

the moment when continuing to reason would mean distorting reality —

and when abstention becomes the highest form of lucidity.

This rupture is not a failure.

It is the summit of the model.

The place where it reveals its full force:

Not in mastery —

but in the ability to remain silent.

Not in accumulation —

but in the clarity of withdrawal.

To think law in five — or five-and-a-half — dimensions

is to offer it a lens that does not confine,

but expands.

Like a wide-angle lens that opens the scene and reveals hidden tensions,

the Penteract draws forth the contradictions that classical approaches obscure.

But this lens also distorts.

It stretches, bends, redistributes.

It does not falsify — it interprets.

It does not mislead — it reveals.

As in physics, a geometric distortion can be deliberate, controlled, and revealing.

To think law is sometimes to reconfigure perspective:

not to deceive, but to do justice to the whole.

Distortion becomes, then, a form of language.

A structure.

An ethics.

From this follows a simple truth:

➤ What we do is never neutral.

➤ But it must remain — profoundly — integral.

There is, within this method, a form of intellectual integrity:

one that makes choices visible,

that names tensions,

that refuses to leave in the shadows what the narrow lens would erase.

The projection we undertake is not manipulation.

It is deliberate modelling —

as a topographic map distorts a landscape to make it readable.

The form may differ from the real,

but the internal relationships are sound.

And it is this relational precision that allows the legal thinker to navigate complexity —

not with the false security of a GPS,

but with the vigilance of an explorer.

This method is demanding.

It requires transparency, lucidity, and restraint.

It asks us to admit that even the finest model may sometimes fall short.

But as long as that limit is acknowledged —

as long as we know where law ends and silence begins —

legal practice retains its deeper legitimacy.

Not because it resolves everything,

but because it allows itself to be questioned.


XII. Conclusion

True law does not culminate in the rule, nor in the verdict.

It is not measured by the correctness of a procedure, nor by the logic of a syllogism.

It begins — truly — where words fall short,

where structure trembles,

where the legal mind, clear-eyed, refuses to shape reality to fit a mould that can no longer contain it.

To think law is to accept that fault line.

To dwell at the threshold.

To name the gap — not to seal it, but to inscribe responsibility within it.

For only in recognising the system’s limits

can legal practice reclaim its humanity.

The Penteract does not offer final answers.

It offers a framework for thinking otherwise,

for seeing more widely,

for acting with precision — even in the face of uncertainty.

This is where law, finally, becomes a space for truth.


STRATEGY, ANGLE OF APPROACH & WIDE-ANGLE PERSPECTIVE

The Strategic Dimension within the Penteract Model


I. Strategy

Strategy is one of the five core dimensions in our legal thinking framework.

It poses a fundamental question: How should we approach this case — in the short term, and in the long run?

This understanding draws from a Belgian legal tradition shaped by figures such as Karel Rimanque,

who reminded us that legal choices are never purely technical:

they are always embedded within a field of institutional and social forces.

To act strategically is also to position oneself ethically — within the legal system.

Walter van Gerven insisted on the jurist’s active role in a multilayered legal universe,

where clarity, timing, and purpose must guide legal action.

Koen Lenaerts, President of the Court of Justice of the European Union,

emphasises that navigating overlapping legal systems demands strategic thinking —

balancing normative hierarchies, institutional dynamics, and contextual expectations.

Every judgment is part of a broader dialogue.

Juliane Kokott, Advocate General at the CJEU,

has often reminded us that legal interpretation cannot be detached from its context, moment, or institutional equilibrium.

Her legal reasoning always starts from a deliberately strategic positioning within the layered legal order.

Likewise, Miguel Poiares Maduro, also a former Advocate General,

argued that every legal act is strategically situated

in a field of tensions between institutions, values, and social expectations.

He called for an acute awareness of the normative implications of each interpretation, each stance.

Among the strategic choices one might face:

– to initiate or avoid proceedings,

– to negotiate or postpone,

– to opt for discretion or visibility,

– to accelerate or decelerate the tempo.


II. Angle of Approach

The angle of approach is a concrete decision within the strategic dimension.

It defines the mode of intervention:

– Anticipatory → before any conflict has arisen (advice, contractual structuring, risk analysis)

– Mediatory → in moments of tension, prior to litigation (negotiation, settlement, strategic dialogue)

– Curative → once the dispute has materialised (defence, litigation, damage control)

The angle of approach is how one positions oneself along the strategic axis.

Strategy is the path.

The angle is one’s orientation along that path.


III. Wide-Angle Perspective

The wide-angle perspective is not about what one does —

but how one sees.

At Peeters Law, no case is considered in isolation.

We account for:

– language,

– cultural layers,

– power dynamics,

– normative structures,

– and all that, though not strictly legal,

influences how law is understood, applied, and felt.

This broadening of the gaze — we call it a wide-angle perspective —

an approach explicitly named by Belgian legal scholar Henri Swennen in his contribution to the Liber Amicorum Karel Rimanque.

He describes how legal thinking requires an expanded visual field,

in which the lawyer must not only focus on the normative centre,

but also attend to the margins of the legal landscape.

This is not an easy metaphor, but a precise analogy —

with optics, where a wide lens captures more of the scene,

and logic, where truth is lost the moment one isolates a fragment from the whole.

We refuse to reduce analysis to a detail.

We observe the whole in proportion.

Without narrowing.

Without distortion.


IV. How These Elements Interact

We view each case through a wide-angle lens.

We analyse it across the five legal dimensions — including strategy.

Within strategy, we define a specific angle of approach:

anticipatory, mediatory, or curative.

The interaction is not linear but layered:

our perspective determines what becomes visible,

our angle of approach shapes how we intervene,

and our strategic analysis aligns the legal course of action

with context, timing, and institutional resonance.


V. Mandate and Professional Ethics

At Peeters Law, we commit to rigorous legal diligence —

not to a predetermined outcome.

Every engagement is accepted within the boundaries of a clearly defined mandate,

and may be discontinued if:

– circumstances change in a substantial way,

– ethical considerations arise,

– or the trust essential to the mandate is lost.

In such cases, we ensure proper handover of the case,

in full respect of our professional duties and ethical obligations.

Our strategic thinking is inseparable from our deontological commitments.

It is not only about what we can do —

but about what we should do, and when we must step back.


TERRITORY — JURISDICTION & APPLICABLE LAW

The Territorial Dimension within the Penteract Model


I. Three Fundamental Questions

The territorial dimension of legal analysis revolves around three cardinal questions:

– Which court has jurisdiction? (international jurisdiction)

– Which law applies? (conflict-of-law rules)

– Can a foreign decision be recognised or enforced? (recognition and exequatur)

These questions are not merely procedural.

They shape access to justice, determine the scope of protection, and define the effective reach of legal rights.


II. A Structure Shaped by Private International Law

This dimension is structured according to the principles of private international law (PIL).

Though often presented as a separate legal discipline,

PIL in fact acts as a coordinating layer —

hovering above substantive law,

designating the applicable legal order,

allocating jurisdiction,

and determining the cross-border effects of legal situations.

Walter van Gerven emphasised that in layered legal systems,

effective coordination is not optional — it is essential.

Applicable law, jurisdiction, and recognition do not operate in isolation:

they form a normative entanglement

whose effectiveness depends on a deep understanding of legal architecture,

overlaps, and latent tensions.


III. Sources of Territorial Analysis

The territorial analysis draws from a constellation of rules and practices:

– national conflict rules (such as the Belgian Code of Private International Law),

– EU regulations (Brussels I bis, Rome I and II, the Succession Regulation 650/2012, and the Matrimonial Property Regulation 2016/1103),

– international conventions (notably the Lugano Convention and instruments from the Hague Conference on Private International Law),

– and from active transnational cooperation with foreign colleagues,

especially in multilingual or cross-border cases.

As highlighted in the Liber Amicorum Karel Rimanque,

territorial competence is not merely a procedural question.

It is a normative node,

where institutional legitimacy, legal access, and equality before the law converge.

Jurisdictional rules structure the legal field —

but they may also, silently, open or restrict access to protection.


IV. Practical Reach and Legal Effect

In cross-border contexts, this dimension can prove decisive.

Without jurisdiction — or without a proper application of conflict rules —

even the most refined legal analysis may remain without effect.

This is why territorial analysis is never purely formal.

It touches upon:

– access to legal remedies,

– the language in which one may be heard,

– and the position a person occupies within an interlaced legal system.

What appears, on paper, to be a straightforward jurisdictional rule

is in fact a crossroads of power, context, and meaning.

In her thesis on conflict-of-law rules within the internal market,

Marta Pertegás Sender demonstrated how private international law shapes the very space of legal normativity.

The chosen law, the designated forum, and the logic of recognition

are not technical footnotes —

they are structuring decisions within a complex legal order.


V. Reflective Closure — The Dissecting Gaze of Heyvaert

Professor Alfons Heyvaert (University of Antwerp) did not view private international law as a series of technical referrals.

He saw it as a zone of constitutive tension,

a space where legal ordering itself is put to the test.

In his teaching and writing,

he reminded us that jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition are never self-evident:

they are normative projections,

translations of deeper choices within a layered system.

His dissecting method reveals that the territorial dimension is not simply about formal competence:

it unveils the places where law shifts,

where structure becomes frontier,

where legal access becomes conditional.

These edge-cases of private international law —

where jurisdictions conflict,

where recognition fails,

or where access is obstructed —

correspond to what we call, within the Penteract model, a Heyvaertian fracture.

Not an error.

A delineation.

A moment of collapse —

where legal coherence falters,

and the legal thinker is called to reflect:

On their position.

On their responsibility.

On the possibility of crossing through.


SUBSTANTIVE DOMAINS OF LAW

The Material Dimension within the Penteract Model


I. Framework and Function of the Material Dimension

The material dimension identifies the substantive area of law relevant to the case.

It is essential for framing the legal issue correctly

and for applying the appropriate normative structures with precision.

At Peeters Law, this analysis rests on a dual structuring:

– Horizontally: by the nature of the dispute (contracts, liability, inheritance, etc.)

– Vertically: by normative level (national, European, international, soft law)

Law is not made up of sealed compartments.

Each substantive domain operates at the intersection of legal norms, jurisdictions, and linguistic frameworks.

That is why we structure this third dimension of the Penteract model

with careful analysis — and with operational clarity.


II. Complexity and Stratification in Practice

A case that appears to concern a simple “rental” agreement may, in reality, require:

– coordination between Belgian and Spanish law,

– application of relevant EU regulations,

– precise translation of contractual clauses,

– and verification of compliance with fundamental rights.

It is this stratification that determines whether legal reasoning is not only correct,

but also strategically effective.

As Walter van Gerven pointed out:

no legal dispute emerges from normative isolation —

it arises from the interaction of legal structures.

Each intervention demands both a layering of normative levels

and a situated interpretation within a complex legal architecture.


III. Delimitation of Our Engagement

National, international, and multilingual

Our practice focuses on cross-border, multilingual, and legally stratified cases.

But we also handle purely Belgian or Spanish matters —

provided they fall within our core areas of expertise

and hold legal relevance within the scope of our practice.

A fundamental rule:

We intervene only in cases for which we possess:

– demonstrated expertise,

– a clearly defined mandate,

– and full compliance with our ethical and insurance obligations.

This delimitation is not a restriction,

but a way to make visible the scope of our commitment —

and the limits we consciously uphold.


IV. Modes of Operation — Internal, Collaborative or Referential

Daily practice — fully handled in-house

Peeters Law assumes full responsibility for the following areas of law:

– Contract law (B2B, B2C, online)

– Liability law (contractual and extra-contractual)

– Labour law and the social status of the self-employed

– Private international law (choice of forum, choice of law, recognition)

– Consumer protection and market practices

– Lease and real estate law (Belgium and Spain)

– Succession law and estate planning in a European context

– Company and association law (Belgium)

– Multilingual contract analysis and legal translation

– Jurisdiction and language clauses, semantic precision

– Usufruct, superficies, dismemberment of property (BE/ES)

– Family estate structuring in comparative law

Collaborative files — with specialised partners

For matters at specialised intersections, we collaborate with colleagues and experts in:

– GDPR and data protection

– Tax law in family or business contexts

– Public procurement and subsidies

– Social criminal law, IT fraud, forged documents

– Competition and distribution law

– Urban planning and spatial development (BE/ES)

– Posting of workers, A1 documents, cross-border employment

– Disciplinary law of regulated professions

In urban planning (BE/ES), we work closely with local planners and legal experts,

as this field extends beyond the technical:

it is constitutionally rooted,

at the crossroads of public law, environmental policy, and property rights.

No direct intervention — referential guidance upon request

For the following matters, we provide structured referral and orientation:

– General criminal law (violence, narcotics, morality)

– Asylum and immigration law

– Medical liability outside the insurance context

– Notarial matters (authentic deeds, donations, partitions)

– Seizures and mortgage procedures

– Family law without private international components

– Requests without legal foundation or outside our professional scope.


V. Why This Delimitation Matters

This threefold distinction — internal, collaborative, referential — is not meant to compartmentalise,

but to make visible the scope of our engagement — and its conscious limits.

It guarantees:

– the quality of our legal work,

– the trust of our clients,

– and the ethical and insurable integrity of our firm.

A clear delimitation makes legal expertise legible.

We do not place cases into static boxes,

but rather locate them within coordinates:

subject matter, capacity, context.

Our commitment is not about claiming omniscience —

it is about positioning ourselves with responsibility and clarity.


VI. Origins and Context of Normative Structures

The division into substantive domains is not simply an academic classification.

It reflects normative choices.

The legislation that shapes these domains does not emerge in abstraction:

it takes form through preparatory work,

expert commissions,

parliamentary hearings,

and a quiet layer of academic expertise —

at the threshold between politics and law.

Law is neither neutral nor purely formal.

It is the result of human decisions, structures, and tensions.

A telling example: the reform of property law (Book 3 of the Belgian Civil Code).

Prepared by a commission established by ministerial decree of 30 September 2017,

under the direction of Professors Vincent Sagaert and Pascale Lecocq,

it entered into force on 1 September 2021,

offering a more integrated, flexible, and instrumental approach to property, superficies, and emphyteusis.

Likewise, the reform of civil liability law (Book 6), in force since 1 January 2025,

was steered by a commission chaired jointly by Professors Hubert Bocken and Patrick Wéry.

Among its major shifts: a redefinition of employee liability —

curbing the scope of quasi-immunity and structurally rebalancing employer-employee responsibility.

And the reform of contract law (Book 5) benefited from contributions by Britt Weyts and others,

who emphasised semantic precision, legal certainty, and systemic coherence.

In the field of liability, Thierry Vansweevelt has shown — especially in medical contexts —

that the delimitation of responsibility is always a normative act:

a choice with ethical and societal consequences.

These reforms illustrate that each substantive domain is not a passive field of doctrine,

but an active construct — shaped by commissions, academic networks, and legislative architecture.

Law is written in layers: material, procedural, semantic, ideological.

In the Penteract model, the material dimension is therefore not merely a matter of content:

it bears structural and political weight.

It shows where and how law is made —

and by whom.

That awareness is part of our method:

legal domains are never fixed.

They are projected structures, carrying effects, choices, responsibilities.


LANGUAGE & LEGAL CULTURE

The First Dimension within the Penteract Model


At Peeters Law, language is not merely a vehicle for communication.

It is a legal dimension in its own right.

Language determines meaning, conditions the validity of legal acts, shapes interpretation,

and inscribes itself in the very structure through which law speaks — and acts.

We do not treat language as a stylistic concern.

We treat it as an analytical instrument,

a legal coordinate as strategic as the chosen norm or the competent jurisdiction.

Our Method of Work

In multilingual or cross-border cases, we:

– compare key terms against their authentic legal versions,

– produce translations that are legally and contextually grounded — never merely grammatical,

– ensure semantic and legal coherence of clauses, jurisdictional assignments, and qualifications,

– and, where needed, consult native-speaking legal professionals —

while never delegating final responsibility.

Our method respects the lawyer’s duty of care:

a rigorous, contextualised legal analysis,

without presuming certainty over future interpretation or enforceability.

At Peeters Law, language is not a risk to be managed —

but a vector of legal force,

a strategic component of every legal structure.

Responsibility and Method

Our approach is founded on the lawyer’s duty of means:

a methodologically sound, context-sensitive, legally anchored analysis —

with no promise of outcome,

but with full commitment to precision and clarity.

At Peeters Law, language is not an accessory.

It is a line of force.

A strategic axis in legal structuring.

Three Levels of Depth

1. Sensitivity to Comparative Law

A single term — such as good faith or force majeure — may carry distinct legal nuances across systems.

We analyse concepts not just linguistically,

but legally and comparatively.

2. Institutional Logic of Language

Courts, notaries, and administrative bodies each operate within their own linguistic register.

We adapt our arguments and terminology to each forum’s expectations —

not to flatter, but to remain audible.

3. Language as Access to Law

Language determines who may be heard — and who remains unheard.

It shapes access to justice, the authority of legal reasoning, and a party’s position within a case.

We treat language not as an add-on,

but as an integral component of legal analysis.


NORMATIVE FOUNDATION

The Fifth Dimension within the Penteract Model


The normative foundation is the intellectual bedrock of all legal reasoning.

It defines the space within which interpretations can be anchored, tested, and justified.

This dimension encompasses:

– fundamental principles of law (human dignity, proportionality, equality, good administration),

– the hierarchy of legal sources (constitutions, treaties, Union law, soft law),

– and doctrinal and comparative readings that enable the interpretation of open norms

and illuminate complex legal situations.

At Peeters Law, each legal position is situated within a system of normative coordinates —

at the intersection of multiple levels and sources.

This Allows Us To...

– situate open concepts — such as reasonableness, privacy, or equity — within a verifiable legal framework,

– integrate European and international law as interpretive and directional layers,

– identify, through doctrine and comparative analysis, the tensions or gaps in positive law —

without claiming to resolve them through binding conclusions.

We do not treat normative openness as a vacuum,

but as a field of structured meaning —

informed by principle, precedent, and interpretive discipline.

Three Normative Layers

1. Framework for Evaluation

→ Fundamental rights, general principles of law, case law from the CJEU, ECtHR, and highest national courts.

2. Framework for Interpretation

→ Soft law, academic doctrine, and multilayered readings of norm conflicts.

3. Strategic Framework

→ Positioning in relation to other legal systems,

→ Exploration of alternative pathways within the existing legal order.

These layers are not separate stages.

They operate simultaneously —

as grids of meaning, orientation, and ethical tension.

Methodology

Our approach is legally grounded and strategically conscious.

Each legal position is:

– aligned with the lawyer’s duty of means,

– embedded within the applicable legal order (national, European, or international),

– tested against the boundaries of our mandate, our ethical obligations, and our professional insurance coverage.

Where relevant, we refer explicitly to treaties, principles, and jurisprudence

to expose normative tensions —

such as those between individual autonomy and legal protection.

This allows us to formulate opinions that are both:

– legally defensible, and

– humanly relevant —

without crossing the boundaries of the law in force

or the scope of the entrusted mandate.


A Belgian Tradition of Pluralist and Constitutional Thinking

Our approach belongs to a Belgian tradition of pluralist, constitutionally grounded legal thought,

in which normative structures, fundamental rights,

and strategic legal reasoning interweave to preserve both coherence and legitimacy.

This tradition refuses to reduce law to obedience.

It insists that every legal position must be traceable —

to a system, to a source, to a justification.

And yet it recognises that even the most structured systems contain tensions.

That is where thinking begins —

not beyond the law, but through it.

POINT OF RUPTURE

The Heyvaertian Singularity: The Projection That Fails


In higher geometry, a penteract is a five-dimensional hypercube.

It cannot be drawn — only projected into three dimensions.

Each projection is necessarily a simplification. A distortion.

And sometimes, within such a projection, a point of rupture appears:

a singularity, an asymmetry, a zone where internal tension becomes so intense

that the coherence of the whole collapses.

This is not a mathematical error.

It is a structural limit of the system.

The Penteract legal model functions analogously:

it is a structured projection of how we think law —

through layers of language, context, legal order, subject matter, and normative grounding.

But even this model encounters its fault line —

a place where it stops working,

where dissection no longer illuminates but disintegrates,

where the model itself begins to come undone.

This rupture point, we call the Heyvaertian singularity.

The Penteract was designed as a methodological framework,

crafted to accompany legal reasoning with maximum precision

and constant structural awareness.

By analysing each case across five interconnected dimensions —

language and semantics, normative context, competent legal order, applicable substantive law, and underlying principles —

the model offers a controlled projection of legal reality.

It functions as an instrument of internal verification,

preventing systemic reasoning errors

and exposing the blind spots of legal analysis.

But every analytical model presupposes a degree of formal closure.

And it is precisely when applied with utmost rigour

that its own limit becomes visible.

When a case, despite being properly structured across all five dimensions,

still clashes against a fundamental friction, an asymmetry, or a moral dissonance —

it is not the model that fails.

It is law itself that reveals a breach.

The Heyvaertian singularity names precisely this:

a point of projection where the legal framework collapses,

undoes itself,

or becomes structurally inadequate.

This is not a moment that calls for ever finer interpretation.

It demands a systemic interruption:

– through a preliminary reference,

– a constitutional appeal,

– or a silent gesture —

an analytical breath,

where logic ends and conscience begins.

In this sense, the singularity is not a flaw.

It is the necessary threshold of any intellectually honest legal method.

It is not a sixth dimension proper.

It is the rupture within the projection of five —

language, context, legal order, substantive matter, normative foundation.

For any model that claims totality must inevitably meet its own frontier.

As in higher geometry, there comes a moment when structure fractures,

projection fails,

and a singularity appears —

a space where the system loses its internal coherence.

This fracture — the Heyvaertian singularity — arises when:

– the normative structure produces an exclusion it cannot repair,

– law protects itself at the cost of justice,

– none of the five dimensions can expose the injustice without diminishing or masking it,

– the lawyer can no longer argue within the system,

but must call the system itself into question:

suspend it, confront it, strip it bare.

At that point, the model must be left behind —

not out of weakness,

but out of necessity.

This singularity is not an enrichment.

It is a reminder —

that every model has its limits.

And that to think law means knowing when to lay the analytical tool aside,

in order to hear what the structure can no longer express.

It is the moment when the legal thinker —

rather than extending the reasoning —

submits a preliminary question,

invokes a constitutional deficit,

or — quite simply — interrupts the law.

As Professor Fons Heyvaert taught:

Dissect. And if you find nothing, ask why the system is built this way.

Why does this singularity bear his name?

Because Alfons Heyvaert — more than anyone — stripped legal thinking to its bare structure,

and stopped there,

to show what law does not say.

Not as theory.

As method.

Not out of ethics.

Out of dissection.

Never to embellish what had to be seen as it was.

Foucault thought power.

Kennedy politicised law.

But Heyvaert was a jurist.

A lawyer. A teacher.

He dissected, exposed — and left it exposed.

His bibliography speaks for itself:

dissected and denuded —

without reconstruction, without compromise.

This dimension bears his name not as homage,

but as structural reminder:

that law must be questioned in its claim to normativity.

And the one who never asks that question…

takes the system too seriously.

The Penteract model was conceived by Peeters Law as a thinking tool:

a structure for analysing law in its linguistic, normative, contextual, material, and strategic dimensions.

It does not claim to speak truth.

It offers a compass —

for strategic thought,

for legal conscience.

But this model itself — like the law it reflects —

must remain open to doubt.

Because every structure also conceals.

Every structure excludes.

Heyvaert reminded us that legal thought does not end in analysis —

it begins in the discomfort it reveals.

That is why the Penteract remains useful only as long as it continues to question.

The moment it becomes self-evident, it must be dismantled.

Just as Heyvaert stripped legal institutions to the bone,

the model too must, at its hour, be undone —

not to deny what it offers,

but to make space for what it leaves out.

A model that does not interrupt itself becomes doctrine.

And then, it ceases to be a tool of thought.

It becomes part of the problem.

Sometimes, we do not learn by receiving an answer —

but by being disturbed.

Not by repetition —

but by dissection.

In law —

where routines harden into rules,

and rules are mistaken for truths —

this kind of thinking is rare.

But irreplaceable.

To think this way begins with one question:

What is law, really?

It is not a neutral system.

It is not an objective technique.

It is a language.

A structure of exclusion, protection, and hierarchy.

An architecture of social relations presented as principles.

Constellations of power disguised as norms.

Marriage, in this light, is not a romantic institution —

but a distribution of rights, duties, and social security.

Nationality, not an identity —

but a legal filter.

Family law, not a shelter for autonomy —

but the organisation of inequality.

And the legal subject?

Not a free individual,

but a position within a system that decides

who counts,

who is heard,

and who is granted access to rights.

> “A relationship is often not personal, but economic —

a relation between estates far more than between persons.”

(Liber Amicorum Heyvaert, 2002)

To think in this way

is not to collapse into doctrine.

It is to take a stance.

Against lawyers who see law

as a system of order and rules,

rather than an instrument of social reproduction.

Against the notion that marriage is a bond of love,

without naming its insurance logic.

Against the illusion that nationality is primarily cultural or political,

rather than a legal entry ticket to rights and protection.

This way of thinking does not reject law —

it passes through it.

And it asks:

Why is it so?

Who benefits?

What alternatives could be imagined?

It is not guided by the rule,

but by the fracture.

Not by doctrine,

but by resistance.

And anyone who has faced it knows:

it is uncomfortable.

It is slow.

It is exact.

> “His lectures were not for those who wanted to build.

They were for those who wanted to dismantle —

to see how things (re)take place.”

(Liber Amicorum Heyvaert, 2002)

In our legal practice, this approach resonates —

with care, without mimicry.

But in every case analysis, every legal translation, every normative tension,

we feel:

Law is not self-evident.

It calls for dissection.

And for ethical awareness of what that dissection reveals.

In analysing a cross-border cohabitation contract,

the distinction between legal fiction and lived dependency became unavoidable.

The contract presumed equality.

But to any gaze trained by Heyvaert’s method,

inequality had been normalised —

in the division of care, labour, property, and futures.

In such cases, his method taught us —

those of us fortunate enough to encounter his thought —

that law must be analysed not only through applicable norms,

but through invisible dynamics and social asymmetries.

> “The only truly free personal relationships

are those that law does not recognise.”

(Het personen- en familierecht ont(k)leed — Personal and Family Law De(con)structed)

This is not a conclusion.

It is a point of departure.

It invites us to reread,

to pose the questions we prefer to avoid,

to seek clarity without falling into ideology.

This radical yet analytical attitude

is what made Heyvaert a master to many —

a singular voice in legal thought.

Alfons Heyvaert (1936–2024)

Professor. Lawyer. Thinker. Teacher.

He was not the one who taught us what we know.

He was the one who taught us where to begin:

with the question.

With resistance to the obvious.

With the dissection of law.

Disclaimer – Legal Notice Peeters Law

The content of this page is a general methodological presentation of the internal approach of Peeters Law.

It shall not be interpreted as an offer within the meaning of Article 5.57 of the Belgian Civil Code,

nor as personalised legal advice.

This text does not constitute a declaration of intent to conclude a contract (Article 5.20 C. civ.),

nor an invitation to negotiate as defined in Article 5.15, §2 C. civ..

No contractual or pre-contractual obligation may arise from the publication, consultation, or interpretation of this material.

The theory of legitimate expectations (Article 5.22 C. civ.) does not apply,

insofar as no reasonable reliance can be based on a public communication that is explicitly characterised as non-binding.

A valid agreement with Peeters Law may only arise through a written, clear, and unequivocal expression of will,

confirmed in physical or digital form.

Unilateral communications by email, implicit conduct, or prior invoicing may never be construed as acceptance

or as the establishment of a mandate without a formal agreement.

Peeters Law expressly disclaims any contractual or pre-contractual liability arising from this publication,

except in cases of fraud or proven gross negligence.

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Peeters Law

Jos Smolderenstraat 65, 2000 Antwerpen, Antwerp, Belgium

+32 3 544 93 55 info@peeterslaw.com